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Determining the best use of food safety resources is a difficult task faced by 
public policymakers, regulatory agencies, state and local food safety and health 
agencies, as well as private firms. The Food Safety Research Consortium (FSRC) 
has developed a conceptual framework for priority setting and resource 
allocation for food safety that takes full account of the food system’s complexity 
and available data but is simple enough to be workable and of practical value to 
decisionmakers. The conceptual framework addresses the question of how 
societal resources, both public and private, can be used most effectively to reduce 
the public health burden of foodborne illness by quantitatively ranking risks and 
considering the availability, effectiveness, and cost of interventions to address 
these risks. We identify two types of priority-setting decisions: Purpose 1 priority 
setting that guides risk-based allocation of food safety resources, primarily by 
government food safety agencies, across a wide range of opportunities to reduce 
the public health impact of foodborne illness; and Purpose 2 priority setting that 
guides the choice of risk management actions and strategies with respect to 
particular hazards and commodities. It is essential that such a framework be 
grounded in a systems approach, multi-disciplinary in approach and integration 
of data, practical, flexible, and dynamic by including ongoing evaluation and 
continuous updating of risk rankings and other elements. The conceptual 
framework is a synthesis of ideas and information generated in connection with 
and during the three FSRC workshops convened under a project funded by the 
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service of USDA.  
 
Workshop materials are available on the project website: 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/food_safety/.   
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A Conceptual Framework  
 
The Food Safety Research Consortium (FSRC) has developed a conceptual 
framework for prioritizing opportunities to reduce the risk of foodborne illness 
under a project funded by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and 
Extension Service (CSREES) of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), National Integrated Food Safety Initiative.1 The project takes advantage 
of the FSRC’s ongoing development of a computer-based model for quantifying 
and ranking the public health impact of specific foodborne hazards. The project 
Prioritizing Opportunities to Reduce the Risk of Foodborne Illness addresses the 
follow-on question of how societal resources, both public and private, can be 
used most effectively to reduce the public health burden of foodborne illness. 
 
The fundamental idea behind this conceptual framework is that public and 
private actors can improve how they set food safety priorities and allocate 
resources by quantitatively ranking risks and considering the availability, 




Determining the best use of food safety resources is a difficult task because the 
food system itself and the natural and human factors that contribute to the cause 
and prevention of foodborne illness are very complex. The goal of this project, 
therefore, is to devise a conceptual framework for priority setting and resource 
allocation for food safety that takes full account of the system’s complexity and 
available data but is simple enough to be workable and of practical value to 
decisionmakers. The framework is only the starting point. The next step is the 
development of specific analytical tools and data systems to implement the 
                                                 
A grant from USDA’s Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES), 
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support for this work. 
1 More information on the FSRC is available on the website: http://www.rff.org/fsrc/fsrc.htm. 
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Maryland; and Michael Taylor, formerly Resources for the Future (RFF) and now University of 
Maryland. Other key contributors include Ewen Todd, Michigan State University; James Dickson, 
Iowa State University; Catherine Woteki, formerly at Iowa State University and now Mars, Inc.; 
John Galland, University of California at Davis; and Michael Batz, Sandra Hoffmann, and Alan 
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framework and thus help achieve the ultimate goals of better resource allocation 
and risk management and a reduced public health burden of foodborne illness. 
The proposed conceptual framework and analytical tools harness available 
information on the magnitude and distribution of risks and the effectiveness and 
cost of interventions to inform objectively, but not dictate, decisions about 
priority setting and resource allocation.  
 
An “opportunity” to reduce the risk of foodborne illness exists when there are 
identifiable actions or control strategies that could be applied to a specific 
hazard. We define these risk management actions and strategies as 
“interventions,” a broad term intended to capture typical government and 
private actions, including but not limited to implementing changes to a process 
or behavior, introducing physical measures to prevent or decrease 
contamination, setting food safety performance standards, defining best practices 
(Good Agricultural Practices, Good Manufacturing Practices, Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Points), changing labeling requirements, or educating food 
handlers. 
 
In this document, we first identify two types of priority-setting decisions and 
provide some key principles of the framework. Next, we introduce the four 
analytical elements that comprise the framework. We detail how these four 
analytical elements inform Purpose 1 priority setting and, subsequently, how 
they inform Purpose 2 decisions.  
 
The framework is a synthesis of ideas and information generated in connection 
with and during the three workshops convened under this FSRC project. 
Workshop materials are available on the project website: 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/food_safety/. Appendix A contains the objectives 
of and a listing of presentations for the three workshops. 
Two Purposes 
 
The nature of the data and analysis required to set food safety priorities depends 
on the purpose for which the priority setting is being done, and there can be a 
host of such purposes in both the public and private sectors. Relevant food safety 
priority-setting decisionmakers include Congress and those developing annual 
federal budgets; regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA); the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); 
state and local food safety and health agencies; and private enterprises involved 
in food production, processing, marketing, and preparation. For a more detailed 
review of the institutional contexts for priority-setting decisions, see Appendix B.  
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For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the conceptual framework defines two 
priority-setting contexts relevant for these decisionmakers and organizations: 
•  Purpose 1 is to guide risk-based allocation of food safety resources, 
primarily by government food safety agencies, across a wide range of 
opportunities to reduce the public health impact of foodborne illness 
arising from diverse hazards and commodities. Purpose 1 priority setting 
helps policymakers identify the risks in the food supply and the points on 
the farm-to-table continuum that should be targeted for reducing these 
risks but does not reveal the most effective risk management actions or 
strategies. Purpose 1 can be described, therefore, as broad resource 
allocation. 
 
•  Purpose 2 is to guide the choice of risk management actions and strategies, 
by either public or private risk managers, with respect to particular 
hazards and commodities. Purpose 2 priority setting involves more data-
intensive analysis aimed at quantifying and comparing, where possible, 
the relative effectiveness of alternative risk management actions and 
strategies. Purpose 2 can be described, therefore, as targeted risk 
management.  
 
Within the conceptual framework, Purpose 1 priority setting typically involves 
looking at the broad range of risks that arise across the food system or 
jurisdiction of an agency. An example of a Purpose 1 context is determining 
which of many possible pathogens or chemical residues pose the greatest 
concern to public health and therefore deserve priority attention for action or 
further analysis.2 Typically, regulatory agencies look at Purpose 1 within their 
own jurisdictions or, in the case of CDC and other crosscutting agencies, across 
the entire food system. The conceptual framework for Purpose 1 priority setting 
would be particularly helpful to programs or agencies during strategic planning, 
in developing annual work plans and annual budget requests. Eventually, 
Congress could use such analysis to inform the authorization of legislation and 
annual appropriations.   
 
Because of the breadth and complexity of the food safety issues confronted in 
Purpose 1 priority setting, the analysis is necessarily and appropriately 
                                                 
2 Potential hazards arising from intentional contamination of the food supply, such as through a 
bioterrorism incident, are also important to consider in priority setting. Efforts to quantify the 
public health importance of such hazards and assess the cost and effectiveness of interventions to 
minimize them, however, pose data and methodological challenges that differ in important 
respects from hazards posed by the more traditional and better-studied hazards that result from 
unintentional contamination. Intentional contamination is thus not addressed in this framework 
but is an important topic for future work.  
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conducted to consider major policy decisions or broad resource allocation 
compared with the more intensive and narrowly focused analysis that supports 
Purpose 2 priority setting.  
 
Purpose 2 risk management strategies typically focus on particular hazardous 
agents or categories of hazards, such as 
 
•  Specific agent–food combinations, for example, E. coli O157:H7 in ground 
beef, or Salmonella enteritidis in eggs; 
•  A grouping of foods associated with a particular pathogen or other agent, 
for example, Listeria monocytogenes in meat, dairy, and other commodities; 
or 
•  All agents associated with a particular food or food category, for example, 
the safety of broiler chickens as affected by Salmonella, Campylobacter, and 
other pathogens, or the safety of produce as affected by all microbial and 
chemical hazards.  
 
Purpose 2 risk management involves priority setting in the sense that choices 
must be made about how to target interventions in ways that minimize the risks 
under review. These choices should be informed as much as possible by 
assessments of the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of interventions, as well as 
of their public health benefits. Of course, risk management decisions and 
interventions must produce results that satisfy legally applicable food safety 
standards. The question is how to achieve these results and other food safety 
goals most effectively. 
 
Purpose 2 analysis is likely to be significantly more data-intensive than Purpose 
1, both because it can be and because it often needs to be. Detailed quantitative 
models can be developed and risk assessments can be conducted to identify and 
compare interventions for specific hazards in specific foods, but these resource-
intensive analyses are not feasible for the large array of hazards relevant for 
Purpose 1 resource allocation decisions. Furthermore, Purpose 2 analysis may 
need to be more data-driven if it is intended to result in government regulatory 
action or spending decisions by private entities. In these cases, decisionmakers 
may seek more detailed and case-specific information about the effectiveness and 
cost of proposed actions to justify their decisions. 
 
Priority setting for food safety cannot be reduced to a formula for either purpose, 
however. Determining the resource allocations or risk management strategies 
that are best for public health will always require judgment concerning a range 
of values and factors — political, policy, legal, or scientific — that are not 
amenable to quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, basic comparisons can be made 
on the available scientific information. 
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Key Principles  
 
In developing a proposed conceptual framework for priority setting, the FSRC 
has identified some key principles that it considers important in making such a 
framework workable and useful.  
 
•  The goal is to improve the scientific and factual basis for 
o  risk-based allocation of food safety resources; and 
o  reducing the public health burden of foodborne illness. 
 
•  Practicality must guide both the conceptual framework and the 
development of specific analytical approaches and tools, in recognition of 
the actual needs of decisionmakers, the inherent limitations of available 
data, and the financial and time costs of analysis. 
 
•  Within the bounds of practicality, the conceptual framework and 
analytical tools for priority setting must be 
o  based on the best available science; 
o  grounded in a “systems” understanding of how foodborne illness is 
caused and prevented; 
o  transparent regarding assumptions and limitations; and 
o  flexible as a tool for analysts and decisionmakers, not a source of 
the “right answer” on food safety priority setting. 
 
•  The priority-setting framework should be used prospectively to guide 
program planning and resource allocations; it should not be used to 
impede normal public health and regulatory decisionmaking that must 
occur routinely in the face of incomplete information and uncertainty.  
 
•  The priority-setting framework should foster iterative, dynamic, and 
continuing evaluation, decisionmaking, and re-evaluation as new data 
and lessons from experience become available.  
 
Four Analytical Elements 
 
We organize the conceptual framework around four analytical elements — risk 
ranking, intervention assessment, health impact estimation, and combined 
evaluation — that apply to both Purpose 1 and Purpose 2 priority setting, albeit 
to widely varying degrees. These elements are summarized in this section, with a 
more detailed discussion of the conceptual framework for Purpose 1 and 
Purpose 2 priority setting given in the following section. 
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•  Risk ranking — to rank the relative public health impact of the food safety 
risks under consideration based on known human health outcomes, which 
may be supplemented in Purpose 2 priority setting by information from 
more detailed risk characterizations and assessments. 
•  Intervention assessment — to identify potential risk reduction interventions 
and, when available data permit, understand their feasibility, 
effectiveness, and cost. In intervention assessment, effectiveness is 
computed in terms of a surrogate measure for public health impact, such 
as level of contamination.  
•  Health impact estimation — to compute, as permitted by available data, the 
public health effectiveness and benefits of specific interventions and 
intervention strategies considered in the intervention assessments. In 
health impact estimation, effectiveness is computed in terms of public 
health outcome measures, such as annual illnesses, hospitalizations, or 
fatalities, and benefits are computed using aggregate measures, such as 
economic valuation or quality-of-life metrics. 
•  Combined evaluation — to integrate data from the risk ranking, intervention 
assessment, and health impact estimation to inform resource allocation 
and risk management decisions. Combined evaluation includes cost-
effectiveness analysis and cost–benefit analysis, when appropriate. 
 
These four analytical elements of the framework for decisionmaking about 
setting food safety priorities are shown in Figure 1. The figure also shows the 
important role of data collection and ongoing evaluation of intervention 
effectiveness and health outcomes. As public health surveillance data, 
contamination data from animals and food, and other data bearing on the 
effectiveness of intervention efforts become available following changes in 
oversight, regulation, agency policy, or resource allocation, these data should 
feed back into subsequent decisionmaking. Figure 1 shows the iterative nature of 
the conceptual framework. Effective food safety decisions will result in 
reductions in specific risks in subsequent years; risk rankings and subsequent 
priority setting should reflect these changes. If interventions prove through 
ongoing evaluation to be ineffective or less effective than newly available 
interventions, this too should be considered in future decisionmaking. 
 
While the four elements apply conceptually to both Purpose 1 and Purpose 2 
priority setting, the priority-setting purpose and institutional context will heavily 
influence the relevance and data intensity of the assessments, as outlined in the 
next section. 
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Purpose 1 Risk Ranking 
 
The primary analytical element applicable to broad Purpose 1 priority setting is 
the identification, quantification, and comparison of the public health impact of 
the most significant risks to human health, wherein risk is defined as the 
likelihood of adverse health outcomes associated with particular hazards (such 
as a particular microbial pathogen contaminating a particular food).3 Risk 
ranking, therefore, identifies which hazards are the most significant, not how to 
address them. 
 
                                                 
3 Estimates of national annual incidence of such health outcomes are implicit risk measures, as 
one could simply divide by population to obtain annual per-person risk rates. 
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The Foodborne Illness Risk Ranking Model (FIRRM), which the FSRC has 
developed to perform the necessary risk ranking for microbial pathogens, is 
quantitative and driven by empirical data, but semi-quantitative or qualitative 
methods might also be used for the identification of the most important hazards.  
 
The key questions that the risk ranking should answer to support Purpose 1 
priority setting are the following: 
 
1.  What is the quantified public health impact of each agent–food 
combination under consideration?  
2.  What is the quantified public health impact of each food, aggregated 
across all significant agents? 
3.  What is the quantified public health impact of each specific pathogen, 
chemical, or other agent, aggregated across foods? 
4.  What are the ordinal rankings of the public health impacts associated with 
these agent–food combinations, foods summed across agents, and agents 
summed across foods?  
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach  
 
•  Risk ranking and context. Risk ranking is the critical first step in priority 
setting for food safety because the largest risks also present the largest 
potential opportunities to reduce the public health burden of foodborne 
illness. Risk ranking may also serve a “screening” purpose for 
determining which risks to focus on in Purpose 2 decisionmaking. For 
broad resource allocation purposes, the initial ranking of risks in Purpose 
1 need not be comprehensive, but it should encompass the agents, agent–
food combinations, and foods or food categories that account for a 
substantial majority (such as 75%-90%) of public health outcomes 
attributable to known hazards within the jurisdiction of the body doing 
the priority setting. An adequately robust ranking of risks in accordance 
with the questions previously outlined would provide important insights 
on most significant hazards from a public health perspective and could, 
without further analysis, justify immediate shifting of resources and risk 
management attention to particular significant hazards. Risk ranking also 
would enable decisionmakers to focus further and more refined Purpose 1 
intervention assessments (in which the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost 
of interventions are considered) on the top tier of hazards. 
 
•  Public health impact. In Purpose 1 priority setting, it is important to focus 
on the public health impact of illnesses attributable to specific hazards, 
rather than on other intermediate metrics of potential health impact, such 
as measures of contamination. This ensures that broad priority-setting and 
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resource allocation decisions are driven as much as possible by actual 
health outcomes, which is the ultimate concern of the food safety system. 
The FSRC’s risk-ranking model (FIRRM) takes this approach. Some of the 
lessons learned from development of FIRRM are summarized in 
Appendix C. 
 
•  Food categorization. Foods may be categorized in different ways for 
priority-setting purposes. For example, foods can be categorized by 
commodity at the single-ingredient level (for example, wheat flour) or by 
type of food as eaten (for example, bread). Food categories should reflect 
the characteristics of the risks being compared. For example, trace 
chemical pesticide risks that enter at the farm stage and may remain 
relatively constant through production may be better served by analysis at 
the level of raw commodities, whereas microbiological risks that can be 
introduced or increased throughout the system, including during 
preparation, may be better served by analysis of foods as eaten. 
 
•  Measures and ranking. There are numerous measures one might use to 
estimate the public health impact of hazards, including estimates of total 
cases of illness, annual hospitalizations, or fatalities. However, comparing 
illnesses with different symptoms, severities, fatality rates, and chronic 
sequelae requires the use of aggregate measures such as economic 
valuation or Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). These should be the 
basis for primary rankings but simpler, more narrowly defined measures 
may be useful to consider as well. For example, a decisionmaker may be 
particularly interested in impacts on sensitive populations (such as kidney 
failure in small children or pregnancies resulting in miscarriage). 
 
•  Routine risk ranking. Risk ranking should be performed routinely. As 
new data become available, preferably annually, the impacts of different 
food–hazard combinations should be re-ranked. Changes from previous 
years may reflect the success or failure of priority-setting decisions and 
resulting interventions or may show growing or declining risks. 
 
Purpose 1 Intervention Assessment 
 
While priority setting for broad resource allocation purposes can be usefully 
informed by risk ranking alone, the deployment of resources and targeting of 
efforts should also be informed to the extent possible by information on the 
feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of interventions to reduce risk. Once risk 
ranking identifies which hazards are most significant, intervention assessment 
identifies how to address them. 
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The following four questions should guide the intervention assessment: 
 
1.  At what points across the farm-to-table continuum could interventions be 
applied to reduce the risk (and public health impact) of foodborne illness? 
2.  What is known about the technical feasibility of available interventions? 
3.  What is known about the relative effectiveness of available interventions? 
4.  What is known about the relative costs to government of implementing 
available interventions? 
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach 
 
•  Role of intervention assessment. Intervention assessments can add to the 
quality of Purpose 1 priority setting because some higher-ranked hazards 
may not have known or available interventions, whereas important but 
lower-ranked hazards may be readily amenable to available interventions 
that are known to be cost-effective. In such a case, the risk manager may 
choose to focus regulatory resources or other active interventions on the 
latter hazards, while choosing to focus research efforts on developing 
possible interventions for the former.  
 
•  Food system perspective. The intervention assessment for Purpose 1 
should look broadly at the food system as a whole in identifying 
opportunities to reduce risk, rather than focusing on a specific point in the 
system or small set of alternatives. Purpose 1 intervention assessments can 
be much less quantitative than for Purpose 2 priority setting, as they 
should focus more on the availability and feasibility of interventions 
rather than on quantitative measures of effectiveness. 
 
•  Interventions. Information exists in the literature and in the expertise of 
food producers, processors, and food safety practitioners on identifying 
possible interventions to reduce major risks and assessing their feasibility. 
Some interventions may affect multiple hazards and introduce 
complementarities across hazards in the effectiveness of control. Although 
the exact relationship likely will not be known, Purpose 1 intervention 
assessment and priority setting can account for these effects through 
sensitivity analysis using available data in order to understand better the 
potential for interventions to reduce a hazard or hazards and improve 
public health. 
 
•  Measurement of effect. For Purpose 1 priority setting, quantitative 
assessment of the effectiveness of interventions is not likely to be practical. 
Ideally, effectiveness of interventions should be measured in terms of 
public health outcomes, but even surrogate measures for public health 
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impact, such as reductions in pathogen load, are beyond Purpose 1 
analysis. The methods and issues involved in quantifying effectiveness are 
discussed in connection with Purpose 2 intervention assessment.  
 
•  Costs. In Purpose 1 priority setting, information about costs to the 
government of implementing interventions — such as the costs of 
researching, setting, and enforcing standards at different points across the 
food system — could help influence the choice about where to target 
efforts since it would be desirable to give higher priority to risks and 
opportunities to reduce risk for which cost-effective interventions are 
available. Detailed data on government costs may not be readily available 
on the wide array of possible interventions that might be considered in 
Purpose 1 priority setting, and such data are not essential to such priority 
setting since it is focused on guiding resource allocation at a broad system 
level and targeting future analytical and risk management efforts rather 
than selecting specific interventions and intervention strategies. 
 
Purpose 1 Health Impact Estimation 
 
Despite the difficulty of predictively linking possible interventions to health 
outcomes, health impact estimation is important to priority setting for food 
safety because improving health outcomes is the ultimate goal. For Purpose 1, 
however, the FSRC conceptual framework does not envision the quantitative 
estimation of health benefits from interventions, as Purpose 1 intervention 
assessment is largely qualitative, and because this level of detail is not necessary 
as a guide to broad resource allocation decisions. Issues and approaches to 
quantitative health impact estimation are discussed in connection with Purpose 
2. 
 
Purpose 1 Combined Evaluation 
 
Purpose 1 priority setting should be based on a ranking of the most important 
hazards from a public health perspective, informed when appropriate and 
possible by an attempt to identify and assess opportunities to reduce these 
hazards. That is, the risk ranking results should be combined with the results of 
the intervention assessment. The prioritization of opportunities to reduce the 
public health impact of foodborne illness at the Purpose 1 level therefore 
involves three summary questions: 
 
1.  Based on the risk ranking (such as that derived from FIRRM), what are the 
most significant hazards in terms of public health impact, and what are 
their relative rankings? 
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2.  To what extent are certain hazards and associated public health impacts 
more amenable than others to reduction with available interventions? 
3.  Considering what is known about the feasibility and, if available, cost-
effectiveness of available interventions, which intervention opportunities 
are likely to make the greatest contribution to reducing the public health 
impact of foodborne illness, including addressing multiple hazards at 
once? 
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach  
 
•  Practical rankings and evaluation. As a practical matter, a reasonably 
comprehensive ranking of risks based on public health impact (such as 
anticipated from FIRRM) can by itself make a meaningful contribution to 
improving resource allocation by helping ensure that both immediate 
public interventions and further analysis are focused on the most health-
significant hazards. Purpose 1 priority setting can be further refined by 
incorporating even qualitative information on the availability and 
effectiveness of interventions to identify the most productive 
opportunities to reduce risk and public health impact. 
 
•  Decisions made in the presence of uncertainty. It is not typically 
practical or wise for policymakers to await perfect quantitative 
assessments of intervention effectiveness and health benefits to make 
broad Purpose 1 priority setting and resource allocation decisions. 
Decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty. Priority-setting 
analyses can inform decisionmakers and improve food safety, but risk 
managers often must act in the face of incomplete information and 
scientific uncertainty; such necessary action to improve food safety should 
not be delayed solely for the sake of improving priority-setting analyses. 
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Purpose 2 Risk Ranking 
 
Purpose 2 priority setting largely concerns the targeted management of risk from 
specific hazards that have been previously determined, possibly through 
Purpose 1 analysis, to be significant enough to warrant specific action. As a 
result, Purpose 2 risk ranking is not as broad as Purpose 1 risk ranking, and may 
incorporate detailed information from “bottom up” risk assessments or other 
quantitative analyses. For example, the series of risk assessments by USDA and 
FDA on Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat foods were used to rank risks of the 
pathogen from numerous food vehicles. Because the Purpose 2 risk ranking is 
intended to support risk management decisionmaking, other more in-depth 
information from risk assessments may also be relevant, such as whether there 
are specific sub-populations that are of special concern. Otherwise, Purpose 2 
risk ranking is guided by the same questions and approach relevant for Purpose 
1 risk ranking.  
 
Purpose 2 Intervention Assessment 
 
In Purpose 2 priority setting to inform risk management, intervention assessment 
becomes perhaps the most critical and difficult analytical element. With respect 
to each significant hazard under review, the following questions should guide 
the intervention assessment: 
 
1.  At what points across the farm-to-table continuum could interventions be 
applied to reduce the risk (and public health impact) of foodborne illness? 
2.  What technically feasible interventions are available at each point? 
3.  How effective are available interventions in reducing the risk of illness in 
terms of surrogate measures for adverse health outcomes? 
4.  What are the costs to government, industry, and consumers of 
implementing the intervention(s)? 
5.  Are there supply chain effects (that is, changes in behavior either up or 
down the supply chain from where the intervention takes place) that will 
significantly influence the ultimate effectiveness of the interventions being 
analyzed? 
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach 
 
•  Key role in ranking interventions. In Purpose 2 priority setting for risk 
management purposes, intervention assessment is likely the most critical 
step because only by understanding the relative effectiveness for risk 
reduction of the range of available interventions is it possible to select the 
interventions and intervention strategies that will contribute most 
successfully to reducing the public health impact of foodborne illness. The 
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intervention assessment step is difficult because it requires predictions 
about the outcomes that specific interventions will achieve. In public risk 
management decisionmaking, the goal of intervention assessment is to 
support ranking of the relative effectiveness of available interventions in 
reducing the public health impact of the hazards under review. In private 
decisionmaking, a range of legal, regulatory, and business needs may also 
motivate intervention assessments. 
 
•  Selection of interventions. It is important to look broadly at the system as 
a whole in identifying and assessing possible interventions to reduce risk. 
While detailed assessments may properly focus on one or a small number 
of possible interventions, the larger context influences the effectiveness of 
particular interventions and thus needs to be considered. Once the whole 
system has been reviewed, a list of candidate interventions for specific 
points in the system must first be identified and then assembled. 
Assembling a list itself requires judgment, since resources are normally 
available to assess only a limited number of interventions, although 
substantial information exists in the literature, and different food safety 
practitioners and stakeholders have expertise and experience. 
 
•  Measurement and data. Ideally, Purpose 2 priority setting would be 
based on direct assessments of intervention effectiveness in terms of 
reductions in public health outcomes, but quantifying the relationship 
between an intervention, the degree of remaining contamination, and 
specific human health outcomes is difficult. Insufficient investment has 
been made in the data, methodologies, and surveillance systems needed to 
assess the public health effectiveness of interventions.  
 
•  Surrogate measures. Surrogate measures (for example, pathogen 
incidence or chemical levels post-processing or at the point of 
consumption) are feasible and useful alternatives to quantifying the 
relationship between contamination and health effect. Purpose 2 
intervention assessment involves estimating effectiveness in terms of such 
surrogates, while subsequent health impact estimation (discussed next) 
quantifies the public health effectiveness of interventions. It is important 
that surrogates be reasonable proxies for public health outcomes, as the 
entire purpose of intervening is to reduce the public health impact of 
foodborne illness. Likewise, the ability to predict reasonably such health 
outcomes based upon surrogate measurements or estimates is important. 
Surrogates are practical because in many cases considerable data on the 
effectiveness of specific interventions with respect to surrogates may be 
available in the literature and in the hands of government research 
organizations and food companies. 
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For decisionmaking at the private level, surrogates may be preferable to 
public health outcomes in measuring effectiveness. For example, 
regulators might set a performance standard for some surrogate variable 
such that this degree of contamination would decrease predicted illnesses 
to an acceptable level (based on dose-response modeling). When assessing 
alternative interventions to meet this standard, industry would focus on 
effectiveness in terms of an intervention’s ability to decrease the 
performance standard surrogate below some threshold, not in terms of the 
predicted public health impact. Similarly, surrogates may be useful from a 
compliance perspective because they are directly measurable. One can 
measure changes in frequency and level of contamination, but measuring 
illnesses caused by contamination from that specific food and pathogen 
will likely remain difficult. 
 
•  Estimation of impact. Estimating the impact of an intervention on some 
surrogate measure may be based on different types of analysis; for 
example: 
o  Experimental data collection: technological innovations, changes to 
process, and other interventions may be evaluated in a controlled 
environment or limited case studies. The results of these 
experiments can then be used to predict the impacts of 
implementing the intervention in the field, or on a wider scale. 
o  Microbial risk assessment methods: knowledge about bacterial 
growth and decline under certain changes to the environment (for 
example, chilling, heating, changes in acidity, chlorination) can be 
used to predict the impact of an intervention. 
 
•  Costs. Intervention assessment includes consideration of the system-wide 
costs of adopting and implementing available interventions.  
o  Costs to government include, for example, specific costs involved 
in researching, setting, and enforcing standards that address the 
risk(s) in question. 
o  Industry costs of implementing interventions are relevant to both 
government and private decisionmaking about risk management, 
though in different ways and to varying degrees depending on the 
decisionmaking context. 
 
•  Secondary adjustments. Applying an intervention at one stage in the 
supply chain may induce adjustments at other points in the supply chain 
that need to be considered in evaluating the overall effectiveness and costs 
of an intervention. Response to any intervention is a dynamic process with 
short-run and long-run effects, and there is often considerable uncertainty 
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about response time, adjustment lags, and longer-run technological and 
structural response that should be considered in estimating intervention 
effectiveness and costs. Economic model simulations to evaluate producer 
and consumer response to relative price changes in inputs or final 
products, or in available technologies can be used to evaluate the 
sensitivity of final market outcomes to specific interventions. 
 
•  Modeling intervention and effect. Intervention analysis requires 
modeling of both the physical process of risk generation and transmission 
and the economic costs and incentives that influence the types and levels 
of interventions adopted. These two steps in the analysis have frequently 
been sequential rather than integrated. For example, a small number of 
interventions are evaluated in terms of their ability to reduce 
contamination (or improve public health outcomes) and then an 
accounting exercise is carried out to estimate the costs of the interventions. 
While useful at a simplified level, this type of cost accounting does not 
measure the full outcome of an intervention in terms of changed 
incentives, technological responses, and ultimate costs. Moving toward 
integrated predictive and economic modeling will yield more accurate 
intervention assessments. 
 
Purpose 2 Health Impact Estimation 
 
The health impact estimation builds on the effectiveness assessment by asking, 
with respect to the significant hazard(s) under review, the following questions:  
 
1.  What specific health outcomes (that is, the symptoms and severities of 
illnesses, including hospitalizations, deaths, and chronic sequelae) are 
generally associated with the hazard(s)? 
2.  Based on the assessment of intervention effectiveness, to what extent will 
the incidence of these outcomes be reduced? 
3.  What is the public health benefit, in economic and/or quality-of-life terms, 
of reducing these outcomes (as measurable by FIRRM)? 
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach 
 
•  Measurement of health benefits. Purpose 2 health impact estimation is 
intended to produce quantitative measures of health benefits by linking 
interventions with actual health outcomes and estimating the impact of 
interventions on incidence and severity of illness. Valuing the health 
outcomes, either in economic or quality-of-life terms, is an important 
component of impact assessment and is necessary for comparing illnesses 
with different symptoms, severities, fatality rates, and chronic sequelae. 
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When interventions can be linked predictively with specific health 
outcomes (rather than non-health surrogates), the data and analytical tools 
for valuing the public health benefit of risk reduction reside largely within 
FIRRM. 
 
•  Linking intervention to health outcome. Linking an intervention to 
public health outcomes is more difficult than linking to a surrogate 
measure but may be addressed using similar methods through predictive 
modeling or epidemiological approaches.  
 
o  Predictive modeling. Information on contamination, consumption, 
and dose–response relationships may be used to make predictive 
estimates of illnesses resulting from contamination measured at the 
surrogate metric. This is essentially a risk assessment approach to 
modeling interventions. Dose–response functions representing the 
individual human health response to a pathogen or other agent 
may be uncertain or biased, however, because of the limitations of 
the data and analyses on which they might be based. The sources of 
data include the following: 
  Data from controlled experiments: laboratory experiments can 
test the dose–response of human beings of various ages and 
immuno-compromised status to different levels of pathogen 
contamination. 
  Data from natural experiments: outbreaks or other observed 
cases of illness may be associated with laboratory-confirmed 
pathogen levels on contaminated food. 
  Extrapolation from other pathogens: information about dose–
response relationships may be extrapolated from better-
known pathogens that have similar properties. 
  Extrapolation from animal data: information may be available 
about the relative dose–response relationship of the 
pathogen on different animal systems. 
  Expert judgment: elicitation of expert opinions may serve to 
combine incomplete information from the aforementioned 
approaches or to estimate a dose–response relationship 
when not enough data are available. 
 
o  Epidemiological and contamination data. It may be possible to 
discern a relationship between an indicator variable of 
contamination and consequential human illnesses if historical data 
are available. This approach does not model the physical process of 
what happens when an individual consumes contaminated food 
but rather compares data before and after exposure. Such data are 
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necessarily confounded because of cross-contamination between 
foods, human contamination of foods post-processing, and 
differences in food storage and preparation. These data are often 
only available after an intervention has been put in place. There are 
various data that might be used, including the following: 
  Traceback: if data were available, investigations into the foods 
associated with outbreaks or cases of illness might be traced 
back through the food system to a point at which 
contamination testing data are available. 
  Temporal analysis: routine food testing data and similarly 
routine public health surveillance data may be analyzed for 
correlations; a spike in contamination may or may not 
correlate with a spike in numbers of persons reporting ill 
with gastroenteritis. 
  Sub-typing methods: pathogen subtyping methods may be 
used to connect human illnesses to specific animal 
reservoirs. 
 
•  Inherent complexity. No matter the approach used to estimate the public 
health impact of interventions, there are complexities inherent in 
capturing the physical and behavioral responses in the modeling, 
including those posed by the following: 
o  Food handling. It may be difficult to ascertain the public health 
impact of an intervention if there are growth or transfer points 
closer to consumption. Cross-contamination from one food to 
another, contamination from human contact, improper storage, or 
insufficient cooking can all offset the benefits of an intervention 
and make direct assessments difficult. That is, as the indicator is 
estimated or measured further and further from the point of 
exposure, the link between surrogate and public health is less and 
less reliable. 
o  Sensitive subpopulations. Many foodborne illnesses are primarily 
associated with susceptible subpopulations, such as the young, old, 
pregnant, and immuno-compromised. Reductions in exposure to 
healthy consumers may not reduce overall illnesses, and, likewise, 
sensitive populations may remain susceptible even to lowered 
exposures. 
o  Antimicrobial resistance. If an intervention decreases 
contamination of some pathogen but could increase antimicrobial 
resistance of that pathogen, the offsetting effects should be 
considered. 
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Purpose 2 Combined Evaluation 
 
The risk-ranking, intervention assessment, and health impact estimation 
previously outlined provide information about particular opportunities, across a 
range of hazards being assessed, to reduce the public health impact of foodborne 
illness. To inform decisionmaking on risk management, it is necessary to 
compare the opportunities to reduce risk by asking these questions: 
 
1.  What is the ranking of opportunities to reduce risk based on their relative 
potential contribution to reducing the public health impact of foodborne 
illness? 
2.  What is the ranking of opportunities to reduce risk based on their relative 
cost-effectiveness ratios and cost–benefit analyses? 
3.  Considering both rankings, how can interventions be most effectively 
targeted to minimize the public health burden of foodborne illness? 
4.  What is the likely timing of alternative interventions and responses? 
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach 
 
•  More detailed information for rankings. The framing of questions for 
Purpose 2 priority setting reflects the assumption that the intervention 
and health impact estimations will have yielded more quantitative and in-
depth information than the corresponding assessments under Purpose 1. 
The combined evaluation of opportunities to reduce risk, whether 
associated with a specific agent–food combination, many hazards (across 
a number of foods) posed by a particular pathogen or agent, or many 
hazards (arising from a number of agents) associated with a particular 
food or food category, can generate the following: 
o  A ranking based only on the amount of risk reduction (as measured 
by indicators or health outcomes directly) that can be achieved, 
considering the magnitude of the risk and the effectiveness of the 
interventions available to reduce it. 
o  A ranking based on cost-effectiveness ratios or cost–benefit 
analyses that reveal the relative efficiency with which particular 
hazards can be reduced by specific interventions (as measured by 
indicators or health outcomes directly or benefits versus costs in 
dollar terms). This permits comparisons across diverse hazards and 
opportunities to reduce foodborne illness risk. 
o  “What if” analysis or comparison of alternative scenarios based on 
firms’ expected use of alternative technologies. Evaluation of 
interventions that allow firms (producers, processors) to choose 
alternative technologies must rely on assumptions about which 
alternative technologies will be adopted. 
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•  Dynamics. Assessment of the timing of interventions and resulting 
reduction in the level or incidence of a hazard may reveal both short- and 
long-run responses, and these responses may differ. The short-run 
response reflects existing technology and operating systems, whereas in 
the longer run new technologies and operating systems may be developed 
and adopted that change the cost and effectiveness of interventions. Thus, 
evaluation or sensitivity analysis of likely adjustments over time is needed 
to inform the combined evaluation of an intervention. 
 
•  Input for risk management decisions. The combined evaluation of 
opportunities to reduce risk, taking into account the magnitude of the risk 
and the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of interventions, is an input to 
risk management decisionmaking by government and private parties. It 
does not select the “right” intervention but informs the decisionmaker on 
the likely impacts of choosing particular interventions. Post hoc 
evaluation of the predictions and outcomes assessments derived from 
these analyses are vital to improving over time their quality and 
helpfulness as an input to decisionmaking. 
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Purpose 1 and Purpose 2 Ongoing Evaluation  
 
Priority setting for food safety is a dynamic, iterative process, not a one-time 
exercise. It is thus vital to include ongoing evaluation of intervention 
effectiveness and health outcomes in the priority-setting process so that 
knowledge gained from experience — regarding successes, failures, and 
unintended consequences — can be incorporated more systematically in future 
decisionmaking. For Purpose 1 resource allocation decisions, this likely involves 
big-picture trend analysis, comparing broad data, such as from public health 
surveillance, before and after significant changes in priorities. For Purpose 2 
decisions, the ongoing evaluation analysis should be more quantitative and 
comprehensive and should, to the extent possible, answer the following 
questions: 
 
1.  Was the intervention effective, as measurable using surrogate metrics, and 
how does the effectiveness compare to predicted values? 
2.  What is the public health impact of the intervention, and how does it 
compare to predicted values? 
3.  How do the realized costs to government, industry, and consumers 
compare to predicted values? 
4.  How do the realized cost-effectiveness and cost–benefit analyses of the 
intervention compare to predicted values? 
 
Discussion and Proposed Approach 
 
•  Data. Public health surveillance and animal and food contamination data 
are probably the most important data sources for evaluating intervention 
effectiveness and health outcomes. Ideally, the data needed for ongoing 
evaluation should be defined at least generally as part of the priority-
setting process and defined in some detail in connection with the 
development of intervention strategies for risk managers flowing from 
Purpose 2 priority setting. In the latter case, the decisionmaker should ask, 
What data are necessary to evaluate this intervention? When specific data 
not currently being collected are necessary for such an evaluation, data 
collection should be built into the risk management strategy. Ideally, 
baseline data generated prior to implementing a new intervention would 
be available as the starting point for evaluation, but the absence of such 
data should not be allowed to delay the implementation of interventions 
judged necessary, based on available information, to address a food safety 
problem.  
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•  Timing. Immediate evaluations for some interventions may be possible 
while others may involve significant lags or long-term trends that would 
not be captured by short-term analysis. Certain interventions may not be 
adequately evaluated for many years after their initiation. 
 
•  Review and response. If the intervention or risk management action is not 
as successful as anticipated, the decision should be re-evaluated. 
Knowledge from ongoing evaluation may inform ways in which the 
intervention can be altered or replaced. Likewise, knowledge gleaned 
from ongoing evaluation can be used to inform future predictive 
modeling and decisionmaking for similar food safety hazards. 
 
Comments and Next Steps 
 
A draft of this document was provided to participants in a national conference 
convened by the FSRC at Resources for the Future on September 14, 2005. During 
and following the conference, the FSRC received numerous helpful comments 
and suggestions, many of which have been incorporated in this final version and 
for which we are grateful.  
 
One important set of comments and questions concerns risk communication and 
stakeholder participation, including a suggestion that the FSRC develop key 
principles on these topics as they relate to priority setting for food safety. This 
topic has not yet been incorporated in the framework and is an important subject 
for future work. While the conceptual framework might be considered “only” an 
analytical tool for decisionmakers, it deals with an issue —priority setting and 
resource allocation for food safety — in which the public has a strong stake and 
that could be misconstrued if not well explained and understood. Better priority 
setting is a powerful tool for reducing the risk of foodborne illness and making 
food safer. To be implemented effectively and to achieve that goal, however, 
public participation and good risk communication are essential. The FSRC 
welcomes further suggestions and collaboration as it considers how to address 
these issues.  
 
The conceptual framework also requires testing and refining, especially as it 
applies to Purpose 2 priority setting and risk management. Such an application 
could be applied in particular contexts, such as specific commodities and/or 
pathogens. The FSRC is committed to this and other work to help make the 
conceptual framework operational as a practical tool for more data-driven 
approaches to priority setting and resource allocation for food safety. Besides 
applying and continuing to refine the framework, these efforts include making 
the FIRRM model operational as a tool to inform priority setting; developing the 
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additional analytical tools required to support intervention, health benefit, and 
combined evaluations for priority setting for food safety; and working with the 
food safety community to improve how the data needed to improve priority 




The conceptual framework for prioritizing opportunities to reduce the risk of 
foodborne illness outlined in this document is 
 
•  grounded in a systems approach to understanding how foodborne illness 
is caused and prevented; 
•  multi-disciplinary in its integration of information and perspectives from 
risk assessment, food science and technology, public health, economics, 
and public policy; 
•  practical in its effort to balance the desire for a scientifically rigorous and 
data-driven approach to priority setting with a realistic accommodation of 
methodological, data, and resource limits on the analysis that is possible 
in the real world; 
•  flexible in embracing multiple purposes and institutional contexts for 
priority setting that influence the nature and depth of the necessary 
analysis; 
•  dynamic and iterative in its emphasis on ongoing evaluation and 
continuous updating of risk rankings and other elements of the 
framework; and  
•  a work in progress, by virtue of the clear need to solve challenging 
methodological and data problems and test the framework with real-life 
case examples. 
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Appendix A: Summary of Workshops 
 
Workshop 1: Approaches to Predictive Modeling 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 
June 15 and 16, 2004 
The first workshop was organized by Iowa State University and the University of 
California-Davis to further develop an integrated approach to analyzing hazards 
and prioritizing opportunities for reducing food safety risk in the U.S. food 
safety system. The workshop focused on identifying and critiquing alternative 
approaches to predictive modeling and the integration of risk assessment and 
risk-control processes across an integrative system.   
Session 1: The Needs of Regulators and the Policy Process 
How do agencies address priority setting for food safety? What drives the 
priority setting? What might future directions be? What vision do the agencies 
have for improvements? What are the priorities for data? 
•  Robert Buchanan, CFSAN, FDA: Agency Perspective 
•  Arthur Liang, Food Safety Office, CDC: Agency Perspective 
•  Philip Derfler, FSIS, USDA: Agency Perspective 
Session 2: Taking a System-Wide Approach 
What is known about where risk enters the food supply? What is known about 
how risk is amplified or reduced? Conceptually, what data should be 
considered? What data do we have? What are the key data gaps? 
•  Arie Havelaar, RIVM Netherlands: A Systems Perspective on Managing Risk 
•  Linda Harris, University of California-Davis: The Systems Approach in 
Context: Fruits and Vegetables 
•  Liz Wagstrom, National Pork Board: The Systems Approach in Context: 
Animal and Meat Products 
Session 3: Overview of Approaches to Modeling in a Global Context 
How can food safety models inform decisionmaking? What characteristics 
should food safety models include? What are the greatest challenges? How can 
models be used to identify points of possible intervention? How can we compare 
food safety interventions?  
•  Glenn Morris, University of Maryland: A Three-Tiered Approach 
•  Jeffrey Wolt, Iowa State University: Data and Modeling Requirements for 
Policy 
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•  Birgitte Borck, Danish Zoonosis Center: The Danish Approach for Associating 
Food Groups with Cases of Human Foodborne Illness 
•  Michael Doyle, University of Georgia: Issues with Respect to Interventions 
•  Julie Caswell, University of Massachusetts: Economic Context 
 
Session 4: Considering Different Approaches to Risk Modeling 
What different methodologies are used or could be used in food safety models? 
How do they differ? What are the key advantages and disadvantages of these 
methods? Which models work best in which situations?  
•  David Hartley, University of Maryland: Descriptive Models 
•  David Kendall, Research Triangle Institute: The RTI Food Handling Practices 
Model 
•  Robert Buchanan, CFSAN, FDA: Risk Assessments 
•  John Galland, University of California-Davis: UC-Davis Model 
Session 5: Breakout Sessions 
Breakout sessions focused on feasibility, relevant (best) models and 
methodologies to identify and assess risks, and data requirements and 
availability from existing data collection systems. 
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Workshop 2: Economic Measures of Interventions 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 
December 2 and 3, 2004 
The second workshop in the series “Building a Framework for Prioritizing 
Opportunities to Reduce Risk” was held at the University of Massachusetts-
Amherst and focused on developing an integrative modeling system approach 
for evaluating the effectiveness of risk-reducing interventions. The approach 
developed was meant to incorporate the technical effectiveness of interventions 
in reducing risk, the resulting benefits from improvements in public health, and 
the costs of intervention. 
 
Session 1. Approaches to Integrative Modeling for Food Safety Interventions 
•  Paul McNamara and Gay Miller, University of Illinois: A Farm-to-Fork 
Stochastic Simulation Model of Pork-Borne Salmonellosis in Humans 
•  Marie-Josée Mangen, G.A. Wit, and A.H. Havelaar, CARMA, 
Netherlands: Controlling Campylobacter in the Chicken Meat Chain—Towards 
a Decision Support Model 
•  Michael Ollinger and Danna Moore, ERS, USDA and Washington State 
University: Approaches to Examining HACCP Costs and Food Safety 
Performance and Technologies 
Session 2. Approaches to Integrative Modeling for Food Safety Interventions 
•  Scott Malcolm, University of Delaware: Operations Research and Firm-Level 
Food Safety 
•  H. Scott Hurd, Iowa State University: Risk-Based Optimization of the Danish 
Pork-Salmonella Program 
Session 3. How Good Is the Match Between These Approaches and How 
Should Risk Management Decisions Be Made? Viewpoints 
•  Derrick Jones, Food Standards Agency, United Kingdom: The UK Food 
Standards Agency 
•  Caroline Smith DeWaal, Center for Science in the Public Interest: Risk 
Assessment/Risk Management: Working Together? 
Session 4. Relevant Studies of Modeling Effects, Benefits, and Costs 
•  Fred Angulo, CDC: Current Work on Food Attribution 
•  Neal Hooker, Ohio State University: Evaluating Risk Management Efforts 
•  Willian Nganje, North Dakota State University: HACCP Implementation and 
Optimality in Turkey Processing 
•  Seda Erdem and Julie Caswell, University of Massachusetts: A Prototype 
Decision Tool: Effectiveness and Costs of Interventions Ranking Model (ECIRM) 
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Workshop 3: Food Safety Interventions and Food Attribution 
Decatur, Georgia 
April 26 and 27, 2005 
The third workshop for the project “Building a Framework for Prioritizing 
Opportunities to Reduce Risk” was organized by the University of Georgia and 
focused on identifying, comparing, and evaluating opportunities to reduce risk 
for both public decisionmakers and private firms. Presentations and discussions 
were centered on two primary objectives:  
1.  Identify locations (intervention points) in the food continuum where food 
safety interventions would have the greatest impact in providing health 
protection.  
2.  Develop analytical methods to evaluate the effectiveness of food safety 
interventions in reducing foodborne illnesses.  
Session 1. Introductory Comments 
•  Michael Taylor, RFF: Constructing the Analytical Tools for a Systems and Risk-
Based Approach to Food Safety  
Session 2. Food Attribution 
This session served as an update on some of the issues discussed at the October 
2003 FSRC Food Attribution Workshop: How can we best attribute cases of 
foodborne illness to food items or food commodities? How can we identify 
locations in the food continuum contributing the most to foodborne illnesses? 
What are the primary data gaps and obstacles in food attribution?  
•  Glenn Morris, University of Maryland: Update on Foodborne Illness Risk 
Ranking Model (FIRRM) and Food Categorization Issues 
•  Sandy Hoffmann, RFF: Expert Elicitation for Foodborne Illness Attribution 
•  Robert Tauxe, CDC: CDC Efforts in Addressing Food Attribution 
•  John Painter, CDC: Status of Foodborne Diseases Outbreak Data for Food 
Attribution 
•  Frederick Angulo, CDC: Blending Data from Sporadic Case-Control Studies 
and Outbreaks for Food Attribution 
•  Elaine Scallan, CDC: Attempting to Apply the Danish Food Attribution Model 
in the U.S. Using USDA, HACCP, and CDC Surveillance Data 
•  Bob Adak, Laboratory Centre for Foodborne Disease Surveillance, 
London: Overview of UK Efforts Addressing Food Attribution 
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Session 3a. Food Safety Interventions: Salmonella/E. coli O157:H7 in Food 
Animal Production 
The first food-pathogen session focused on Salmonella and E. coli O157:H7 in 
poultry, beef, and other food animal production. Presenters represented multiple 
stakeholders, including industry, academia, regulators, and public health 
agencies.  
•  Chuck Hofacre, University of Georgia: Salmonella Reduction in Poultry 
Production 
•  Dell Allen, Cargill (retired): E. coli O157:H7 Reduction through 
Interventions 
•  Sean Altekruse, FSIS, USDA: Strategies to Identify and Evaluate the Efficacy 
of Food Interventions: Impact on Public Health 
•  Bob Adak, Laboratory Centre for Foodborne Disease Surveillance, 
London: Strategies to Identify and Evaluate the Efficacy of Food Safety 
Interventions 
Session 3b. Food Safety Interventions: Listeria monocytogenes in Ready-to-Eat 
Foods 
The second food-pathogen session focused on ready-to-eat foods and Listeria 
monocytogenes. Presenters represented multiple stakeholders, including industry, 
academia, regulators, and public health agencies. 
•  Leon Gorris, Unilever: Minimum Requirements for Effective Food Safety 
Interventions: Cost, Effectiveness of Interventions? 
•  Randall Huffman, American Meat Institute Foundation: Minimum 
Requirements for Effective Food Safety Interventions to Reduce Listeria 
monocytogenes Contamination of Ready-to-Eat Meat Products 
•  Michael Doyle, University of Georgia: Continuous Improvement in 
Reductions in Foodborne Listeriosis: Identification of Approaches Having the 
Greatest Impact 
•  Robert Buchanan, CFSAN, FDA: Strategies to Identify and Evaluate Efficacy 
of Food Safety Interventions Having the Greatest Impact on Providing Public 
Health Protection 
•  Robert Tauxe, CDC: Listeriosis Prevention: Identifying Successes and Further 
Opportunities 
Session 4. Discussion 
The second day of the workshop focused on discussion. This was guided by 
questions presented to the workshop group by the conference organizers. 
Regarding the selection of interventions, the following questions were posed: 
1.  What principles should govern choices about where to intervene on the 
production to consumption continuum? 
2.  What principles should govern choices about how to intervene? 
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3.  How do we predict the cost-effectiveness of proposed interventions? 
4.  What data are needed to make these decisions and how should the data be 
obtained? 
5.  How do we balance the desire for scientific rigor with the practicality of 
decision processes and available data? 
 
Regarding the evaluation of interventions, the following questions were posed: 
1.  Is it feasible to measure directly the health impact of specific interventions? 
2.  If not, are there appropriate and practical surrogates that could provide a 
reasonable measure of public health benefit? 
3.  What data are needed to support post hoc evaluation of intervention 
effectiveness? Who should be collecting these data? Should they be shared, 
and, if so, how? 
4.  How should data collected to evaluate effectiveness of interventions in place 
be brought back into the process for selecting interventions? 
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Appendix B: Institutional Context 
The food safety priority-setting concepts being developed in this project have 
relevance for a range of public and private institutions involved in food safety.4 The 
purposes for which these institutions establish and consider food safety priorities in 
their operations are quite diverse, however, and consequently their analytical needs 
vary.  
 
Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
 
The highest-level opportunity for priority setting for food safety in the federal 
system is among political decisionmakers through legislation and in the annual 
budget process. The current legislative mandates and broad allocation of resources 
among the principal food safety agencies are a de facto statement about food safety 
priorities, and, through the budget process, OMB and Congress have the 
opportunity annually to refine that statement by reallocating resources or by 
directing how current resources are to be spent.   
 
In the recent past, for example, Congress has provided the Food and Drug 
Administration with additional resources to inspect imports, based on a concern 
about foreign threats to food safety. This high-level allocation of resources to 
address a particular category of problems involves what we define for this project as 
Purpose 1 priority setting.          
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 
The FDA has food safety regulatory responsibility for all foods except meat, poultry, 
and certain processed egg products. Working through its Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM), and a field 
network of inspectors and laboratories, FDA implements the food safety provisions 
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The FDCA includes 
provisions that place FDA in charge of pre-market review and approval of food and 
color additives and animal drug residues, but FDA uses most of its food safety 
resources to enforce statutory food safety standards that are defined in broad terms 
by the various “adulteration” provisions of the FDCA. These provisions generally 
require FDA to prove that a particular lot of food or a particular food manufacturer 
is violating the relevant standard. FDA is also authorized to educate the industry 
                                                 
4 A more complete version of this discussion can be found in a July 2003 report prepared by 
several FSRC researchers: Taylor, Michael R., Margaret O’K Glavin, J. Glenn Morris, Jr., and 
Catherine E. Woteki. 2003. Food Safety Updated: Developing Tools for a More Science and Risk-
Based Approach. New York, NY: Milbank Memorial Fund and Washington, DC: Resources for 
the Future. (Available online: 
http://www.milbank.org/reports/2003foodsafety/030731foodsafety.html.) 
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and the public about food safety and to work with state and local governments, 
which focus their food safety efforts at the retail level.  
 
The FDCA provides FDA with a range of tools for performing its food safety roles, 
such as the power to issue regulations further defining safety standards and 
imposing safety-related requirements on food producers, processors, and handlers; 
inspecting domestic production facilities, checking imported foods, and collecting 
and analyzing product samples; and taking administrative and judicial enforcement 
action to remove potentially unsafe food from commerce or punish violators of 
safety requirements. The FDCA and Congress provide FDA with little or no 
direction, however, on how the agency is to deploy those tools or otherwise allocate 
its resources across the wide range of potential hazards and risks arising in the food 
supply. FDA makes these decisions almost continuously in what we label as 
Purpose 1 priority setting.   
 
Once FDA focuses on a topic, such as produce safety or Listeria in dairy products, it 
must still decide what tools to use (for example, new regulations, inspection and 
enforcement, or some combination) and where to focus efforts (for example, at the 
production, processing, or retailing stage). This involves making choices about how 
best to tackle a particular problem to achieve the greatest public health benefit with 
the available tools and resources. This is a risk management activity that includes 
Purpose 2 priority setting.  
 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), USDA 
 
FSIS implements several laws governing the safety of meat, poultry, and certain 
processed egg products. The agency’s meat and poultry jurisdiction covers 
slaughter and processing plants producing both raw and cooked products, 
including plants that produce products containing as little as 2% meat or poultry. 
The FSIS jurisdiction is thus quite broad and includes as much as 25% of the U.S. 
food supply. 
 
In contrast to the FDCA, the laws administered by FSIS provide a very specific 
mandate that determines to a large extent the deployment of FSIS resources. The 
agency is required by law to visually inspect and pass every beef, pork, and poultry 
carcass leaving the nation’s slaughter plants — numbering in the billions annually 
— as a prerequisite for the carcass entering commerce and being used for food. It 
also must by law inspect at least daily every meat and poultry processing plant, 
with no distinction made in the law concerning the nature of the hazards or degree 
of risk presented in those plants. Implementing this comprehensive inspection 
mandate is the focus of the FSIS program and consumes the vast majority of its 
resources. Unlike FDA, FSIS is not authorized to inspect or otherwise regulate on 
the farm. 
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The inspection mandate narrows the scope of the priority-setting opportunity and 
need at FSIS. Nevertheless, though focused on a narrower range of products and the 
in-plant inspection role, FSIS still must decide what pathogens or other potential 
food safety problems (such as BSE) deserve concentrated attention, which is a form 
of Purpose 1 priority setting. In addition, and more commonly, FSIS must decide 
how to deploy its inspection resources and other tools (such as regulations 
implementing the food safety standards in the meat and poultry laws by imposing 
processing, product testing, or other requirements) to address a particular problem. 
This is Purpose 2 priority setting.   
  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 
EPA implements the pesticide provisions of the FDCA, under which EPA 
determines, prior to approval of an agricultural pesticide, how much of a pesticide 
can remain safely in food and sets binding tolerances to limit residues to such levels. 
In addition to reviewing new pesticides, EPA is charged with investigating and 
addressing safety problems with currently marketed pesticides and systematically 
reviewing old tolerances to be sure they have been subject to up-to-date testing and 
meet current safety standards. EPA makes far more safety decisions about chemical 
residues in food than do FDA and FSIS combined, making EPA an important food 
safety agency. 
 
Priority setting for food safety is important for EPA in the same way it is for FDA 
and FSIS in the sense that the agency has finite resources and must decide how best 
to deploy them to protect public health. This need is especially great with respect to 
already-marketed pesticides, which requires Purpose 1 priority setting in choosing 
which pesticides or particular pesticide-related safety problems deserve priority in 
the deployment of field investigatory and scientific review resources. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Other Research 
Agencies 
CDC is responsible at the federal level for foodborne disease surveillance and 
outbreak investigations. CDC coordinates the Foodborne Diseases Active 
Surveillance Network (FoodNet), which tracks laboratory-confirmed cases of 
foodborne illnesses associated with selected pathogens in select catchment areas. 
CDC also coordinates PulseNet, a national network of federal, state, and local public 
health and food regulatory agency laboratories that perform standardized 
molecular fingerprinting of foodborne disease-causing bacteria. In these roles, CDC 
works closely with federal and state regulatory agencies and generates large 
amounts of data that can contribute to food safety priority setting by those agencies. 
Like any government research agency, CDC has finite resources, and it must decide 
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continuously how to deploy those resources: which pathogens or other hazards to 
target and how best to mount data collection and dissemination activities to 
advance its public health mission.   
By some counts, as many as 20 federal agencies in addition to CDC are involved in 
food safety research, including FDA and EPA, the Agricultural Research Service and 
CSREES in USDA, and such diverse agencies as the National Marine Fisheries 
Service and the Department of Defense. Government-sponsored research can make 
an important contribution to improving food safety; thus, choices about how to 
deploy scarce research resources are amenable to Purpose 1 food safety priority 
setting, with a view to enhancing that contribution. 
State and Local Food Safety Agencies and Health Departments 
 
State and local agencies focus primarily on food safety at the retail level and on 
investigating and containing outbreaks of foodborne illness. Many also work closely 
with federal authorities and conduct inspections on behalf of federal agencies. They 
are an important part of the national food safety system. Priority-setting needs at the 
state and local level are similar to FDA’s in that the volume of facilities and 
problems within their jurisdictions far exceed their resources, and, lacking detailed 
legislative mandates, they must constantly make resource allocation decisions and 
find cost-effective solutions to problems. State and local food safety agencies and 
health departments thus engage in both Purpose 1 and Purpose 2 priority setting.  
  
Private Firms and Enterprises Across the Farm-to-Table Continuum  
 
The safety of food when it reaches consumers is ultimately determined by the 
individuals and companies that produce, process, and market that food. These 
private actors must operate in accordance with the food safety regulatory standards 
established by federal and state agencies, but they retain substantial discretion and 
responsibility to make their own decisions about how to meet those standards, and, 
for business reasons, many companies operate food safety systems that exceed what 
is required by regulation. 
 
As with government agencies, the food safety resources available to private firms 
are finite, and decisions often must be made about how to deploy those resources to 
achieve the greatest food safety gain. Many of today’s food companies are large and 
vertically integrated and thus face a wide array of potential food safety issues and 
many possibilities for how and where in the system to intervene. In choosing 
problems (such as particular pathogens) or food categories in which to make 
significant new investments, companies engage in a form of Purpose 1 priority 
setting. More typically, however, companies are involved in system design and risk 
management for particular problems and seek cost-effective ways to target 
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interventions and other risks to achieve the desired level of food safety performance. 
This involves Purpose 2 priority setting.  
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Appendix C: Lessons Learned from Developing 
FIRRM 
 
The development of the FSRC Foodborne Illness Risk Ranking Model (FIRRM) 
was motivated by the need to provide answers to the risk-ranking questions for 
both Purpose 1 and Purpose 2 priority setting. FIRRM focuses on microbiological 
foodborne hazards because of their documented public health significance and 
the availability of workable methods for ranking such hazards. FSRC recognizes 
that chemical hazards are also important to public health and need ultimately to 
be included in any comprehensive risk-ranking and priority-setting scheme.  
 
While developing FIRRM, and in subsequent discussions in the “modeling” 
workshop (Workshop 1) included as part of this project, we came to some 
important conclusions about appropriate methodology for answering these 
questions. Seven stand out as the most important: 
 
•  Focus on public health impact. We need to focus on the public health 
impact of illnesses, not other intermediate metrics such as measures of 
contamination, when making broad assessments of which hazards are 
most important. As further discussed in what follows, this raises 
significant data issues: while rates of contamination are directly 
measurable, there remain significant gaps in our ability to link health 
outcomes back to contamination levels. Nonetheless, there should be an 
awareness of the need to use health impact as the final outcome and, 
correspondingly, the need to develop data sources that facilitate the 
linkages among health outcomes, contamination levels, and risk. 
 
•  Focus on food-hazard combinations. For microbiological hazards, we 
need to focus on food–pathogen combinations; knowing which pathogens 
are responsible for illnesses is not enough to guide us toward 
interventions, as interventions are food or process specific. There may also 
be a significant proportion of illnesses related to a specific pathogen that is 
not attributable to food: limiting analysis to pathogen data may provide a 
very skewed picture of actual food-related risks. 
 
•  Incorporate valuation of health states. Valuation of health outcomes, 
either in economic or quality-of-life terms, is necessary to compare 
illnesses with different symptoms, severities, fatality rates, and chronic 
sequelae. Dollars and QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years) (or DALYs 
[Disability Adjusted Life Years]) provide aggregate measures of impact to 
human health across all health states, and such approaches capture 
individual preferences between these health states. One can compute from 
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these data a value per case of illness (averaging over all possible health 
states). Computing these aggregate measures is resource and data 
intensive and requires detailed knowledge and assumptions regarding 
symptoms and treatment, but doing so is absolutely critical to the 
eventual estimation of benefits of interventions. 
 
•  Identify data gaps. The broader the scope of an analysis such as a risk 
ranking, the more likely it is that critical gaps may exist in the data. 
Identifying these data needs is vital, as it may be a valid and important 
priority-setting decision to gather better or additional data, rather than 
proceed with reallocation of resources. In the development of FIRRM, the 
lack of data for attributing illnesses from pathogens to foods presents 
significant obstacles for risk ranking. The best comprehensive source of 
data is outbreak reports, which do not capture sporadic cases and have 
regional, temporal, and other biases. To address the lack of data, we 
gathered additional data and performed an expert elicitation to help 
inform food attribution. Nonetheless, the acknowledged data gap led us to 
convene the Food Attribution Workshop in October 2003 (Batz et al. 2005), 
which has resulted in progress in data availability and research into 
alternative attribution approaches. 
 
•  Consider uncertainty. It is important to consider explicitly the uncertainty 
of estimates; whether using epidemiological methods or predictive 
modeling approaches, data are fraught with gaps, variation, and 
uncertainty. Providing point-estimates alone may lead to a false sense of 
certainty in results that could lead to poor priority-setting decisions. 
 
•  Strive for simplicity and transparency. Transparency and simplicity are 
goals to strive for, even if they cannot always be achieved. Workshop 
presentations and discussions cautioned researchers to be wary of overly 
complex models. Modeling is a very useful approach for unraveling 
difficult problems, but the complexity of a model is not necessarily related 
to its accuracy or utility. The more detailed a model’s accounting of the 
complexity of the transport, growth and inactivation of a pathogen in a 
food, the more likely it is to include errors and uncertainties that are not 
quantified or that may remain hidden to an analyst. There is a clear 
tendency to deal with complexity and uncertainty in the system by 
increasing complexity in the associated model, a process that has a high 
likelihood of giving spurious results. 
 
•  Consider alternate approaches. Although FIRRM is “top down” and is 
based on analysis of public health surveillance data, other foodborne 
hazards likely require alternative approaches. The public health impacts 
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of exposure to chemicals cannot be easily measured through surveillance 
and so concentration-response functions based on epidemiological and 
experimental data must be used to estimate impacts. Likewise, priority 
setting regarding risks with uncertain future components cannot rely on 
current data. Emerging pathogens (unidentified bacteria, the spread of 
avian influenza), pathogens with changing antimicrobial resistance 
(strains of Campylobacter and Salmonella), hazards with uncertain 
exposures or long “incubation” windows (BSE), and hypothetical risks 
(bioterrorism) require predictive modeling methods. 
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